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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 William DeForte was fired as the Chief of Police of Worthington Borough in 
Pennsylvania. DeForte sued the Borough, several Borough officials, and Pennsylvania 
State Police officers, alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights under federal 
and state law. The District Court granted summary judgment to all defendants. For the 
reasons explained below, we will affirm the District Court. 
I 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we recount only the facts necessary to 
our decision. 
After DeForte’s firing, and at the request of Borough officials, Joseph Murphy and 
Joseph Zandarski of the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) investigated a series of 
suspicious events that occurred during and after DeForte’s tenure as Chief of Police. The 
PSP investigated: (1) firearms purchases and transfers that DeForte made as Chief of 
Police, (2) the disappearance of police radios during DeForte’s tenure, (3) a theft of cash 
from the police evidence locker after DeForte was fired, and (4) a theft of DeForte’s 
personal files after he was fired. 
 
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





As a result of the investigation, a local prosecutor charged DeForte with several 
theft-related crimes. The charges were eventually dropped. 
DeForte then sued the Borough of Worthington, Borough officials, and PSP 
officials. DeForte asserted a fabrication-of-evidence claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 
1988, and state-law claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.1 The District Court granted summary judgment to all defendants, and 
DeForte timely appealed. 
II2 
DeForte argues that the District Court erred by (1) finding that there were no 
genuine disputes of material fact that precluded summary judgment, and (2) failing to 
alert DeForte to the deficiencies in his summary judgment briefing. We discern no error 
and will affirm the District Court. 
A 
DeForte contends that the District Court usurped the jury’s fact-finding role when 
it explained, in ten footnotes, that no genuine dispute of material fact remained. Because 
DeForte fails to adequately develop this argument, we will not consider it. 
 
1 DeForte filed two separate actions and brought additional federal claims under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, and a state law claim for abuse of process. After consolidating 
the cases, the District Court dismissed those claims. 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a). We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. 
Chartis Prop. Cas. Co. v. Inganamort, 953 F.3d 231, 234 n.4 (3d Cir. 2020). “[W]e will 
affirm a grant of summary judgment only if there is no dispute as to any material fact and 






To avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff “must come forward with ‘specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis 
omitted). To meet that standard, “the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order 
to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment[,]” Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986), and “cannot simply reassert factually unsupported 
allegations contained in its pleadings,” Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 
460 (3d Cir. 1989). 
In addition, an appellant’s “argument . . . must contain . . . appellant’s contentions 
and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which 
the appellant relies[.]” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 28.3(c) (2011) 
(“All assertions of fact in briefs must be supported by specific reference to the record.”). 
DeForte fails to support his claim of error with citations to legal authority or facts 
in the record. The lack of record citations is particularly problematic here because 
DeForte maintains that the District Court ignored evidence that would create genuine 
disputes of material fact precluding summary judgment. 
DeForte’s argument contains twenty-three citations to the joint appendix. 
Approximately half of those citations are to the District Court’s opinion and not facts in 
the record. DeForte fails to explain how the remaining citations are relevant to his legal 
claims. For example, DeForte submits that footnote four in the District Court’s opinion 
ignored evidence that he was responsible for purchasing the Borough’s firearms. To 





fails to explain how this fact has any bearing on his allegations that the defendants 
fabricated evidence, maliciously prosecuted him, or intentionally caused him emotional 
distress. He makes it impossible to conduct any meaningful review of his arguments.  
“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, briefs must contain statements of all issues 
presented for appeal, together with supporting arguments and citations.” Simmons v. City 
of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1065 (3d Cir. 1991). We see no extraordinary 
circumstances that could excuse DeForte’s inadequate briefing. Thus, we reject his 
argument for failure to comply with federal and local rules of appellate procedure.3 
B 
Next, DeForte argues that the District Court erred by “fail[ing] to alert [DeForte’s] 
counsel about the disastrous state of his responses to the [defendants’ statement] of 
undisputed material facts.” Appellant’s Br. 19 (capitalization altered). He cites no legal 
authority for the proposition that the District Court is required to supervise his counsel’s 
legal filings. And we are not aware of any such authority. A District Court is not obliged 
to provide unsolicited advice that could compromise its impartiality. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 
(“Any . . . judge . . . of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in 
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”). 
DeForte also argues that dismissal would be a severe sanction because his counsel 
is a “[solo] practitioner facing off against well[-]represented Defendants.” Appellant’s Br. 
22. He relies on a concurrence from one of our cases that noted a “substantial disparity 
 





between the parties, in terms of their financial resources and the competency of their 
counsel.” Titus v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., 695 F.2d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 1982) (Fullam, J., 
sitting by designation, concurring). That passing observation neither excuses DeForte’s 
counsel’s shortcomings in the District Court nor relaxes the summary judgment standard 
that we must apply. 
* * * 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment. 
